They say beauty is in the eyes of the beholder, but one could argue that perceptions of discrimination work the same way. In the case of Darryl George v. Greg Abbot, for instance, Jeffery Vincent Brown, a U.S. District Judge, allowed a sex-discrimination civil rights suit to go forward while blocking the one alleging race discrimination. In doing so, the court sparked controversy, suggesting some forms of discrimination are more important than others. Whether bigotry is inspired by someone’s gender or race, the outcome is the same — the individual is deprived of equal treatment and access to opportunities. That begs the question, why would the court show preference for one or the other?
Darryl George, a Texas high school student, endured over a year of in-school suspension after refusing to cut his dreadlocks. Despite wearing his hair up, braided, and out of his face, administrators claimed this style violated their grooming policy. Darresha George told the Associated Press that her son had “to sit on a stool for eight hours in a cubicle” as part of his punishment, a practice that contributed to his experiencing back pain. Administrators took him out of class, not because of any behavioral problem, but because of his appearance. Their enforcement of this policy treated Darryl’s natural hairstyle like a dangerous product unfit for public consumption. While the district defended its decision and suggested the problem was George’s hair length, not texture, this perspective ignores the context. Within the black community, boys and men are not expected to wear short hair, so long hair is not seen as a violation of grooming standards. Secondly, asking someone to cut their dreadlocks is a cultural erasure.
While the Civil Rights Act of 1964 protects people from discrimination based on race, color, and sex, whether that law actually protects someone is a matter of judicial opinion. Federal judges have broad authority to interpret potential civil rights violations. Thus, if a judge fails to consider a school district’s grooming policy as discriminatory to Black students who wear natural hairstyles, then that student will not actually be shielded from the cruel impact of prejudice. In this case, not only did Darryl George lose, but so did other students who wear dreadlocks in Texas schools. This case exposes the outer limits of civil rights legislation, as they rely upon good faith judicial interpretation. While the school district never made a rule explicitly banning students from wearing dreadlocks, the hair length restriction has a discriminatory impact.
When a student reports discrimination because of their natural hairstyle, they’re often told that their racial identity has nothing to do with an infraction. However, black hair has been historically politicized throughout American history. Instead of acknowledging that different racial groups wear their hair in unique styles rooted in cultural traditions, administrators were framing any difference in hair length as a punishable offense. The Barbers Hill school district claimed George’s hairstyle “violates the school’s dress and grooming policy” and vehemently denied claims that their decision is rooted in racism. Or that they violated Texas’ CROWN Act. This narrative is juxtaposed against the court’s decision to approve of the gender-based suit going forward, claiming that “because the district does not provide any reason for this sex-based distinction in its dress code, the claim survives this initial stage.”
However, the district claimed the suit based on race discrimination must be dismissed because the plaintiff allegedly “(1) fail[ed] to establish that George’s constitutional right to be free from racial discrimination was violated by an official policy and (2) fail[ed] to attribute any of the actions of the complaints to any board member.” The judge agreed with their assessment, seemingly taking the approach of “see no racism, hear no racism, speak no racism.” Nevertheless, it matters that the district’s grooming policy disproportionately impacts Black students who are wearing hairstyles that, while acceptable in their community, are shunned by some White school administrators. Black people wear dreadlocks to their local stores, their jobs, and churches — why, then, should they be denied that right to attend public school?
Judge Jeffery Vincent Brown claimed the “plaintiffs have not shown a persistent, widespread practice of disparate race-based enforcement of the policy at issue.” However, the public spectacle caused by administrators depriving Darryl of equal access to an education based on his hairstyle likely had a chilling effect on the district's students and parents. They have to weigh the risks of allowing their children free reign to wear natural hairstyles and depriving them of that right because doing so could make them targets for discrimination. The Superintendent of Barbers Hill school district took out an ad last January, seemingly commenting on Darryl George’s case, in which he claimed: “Being an American requires conformity for the positive benefit of unity.” However, demanding that Black students cut their hair to appease White teachers, students, and parents is demoralizing, not unifying.
As schools open in Texas this August, Black parents and students are forced to make difficult decisions about which hairstyles their children can wear. The Darryl George v. Greg Abbot case adds an additional burden to those familial conversations, as the judge’s decision indicates that the CROWN Act may not protect all students from hair discrimination. Allowing the sex discrimination case to proceed while stopping the race discrimination case dead in its tracks makes it seem like some forms of discrimination are more important than others. Just as beauty is in the eye of the beholder, so is discrimination. After all, the same Supreme Court that banned race-based affirmative action policies did not ban the use of gender-based affirmative action policies. This is particularly interesting because White women, despite being staunch opponents of the policy, were shown to be the greatest beneficiaries of affirmative action.
If someone doesn’t see a case as discriminatory, be they a judge, lawyer, or juror, then that discrimination will not be acknowledged despite the explicit injustices produced. For instance, on June 7, 1892, a conductor denied Homère Plessy a seat on a New Orleans streetcar after he tried to sit in the “whites-only” section. Police arrested him for challenging the Louisiana Separate Car Act of 1890. Four years later, the Supreme Court ruled against Plessy in 1896, claiming the Jim Crow law didn’t violate his constitutional rights. While such blatant forms of discrimination are prohibited in the post-civil rights era, we mustn’t forget that the perception of whether discrimination took place is inseparable from someone’s opinion. This is why federal judicial appointments matter; they impact whether or not racism will be seen or overlooked.
This post originally appeared on Medium and is edited and republished with author's permission. Read more of Allison Gaines' work on Medium.
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